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49 
GENDER, PERSECUTION, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
REFUGEE LAW’S RELEVANCE TO THE CRIME 




The crime against humanity of gender-based persecution was 
first codified in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.1  The recognition of this specific form of persecution has been 
hailed as a significant advance in the field of international criminal 
law.2  The crime against humanity of racially-, politically-, or 
religiously-based persecution has been explored by international 
tribunals and academic commentators, but the newly identified 
gender-based persecution has not been analyzed in the same depth.  
While cases and commentary on the more established grounds can 
and will assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) in examining 
gender-based persecution, especially with respect to the intersection 
of gender with race, political opinion, and religion, the ICC should 
also look outside of international criminal law for guidance. 
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 1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(h), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 2. E.g., Barbara Bedont, Gender-Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 183, 201 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999); Cate Steains, Gender Issues, 
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, 
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 357, 371 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as 
War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL 
L.J. 217, 237 (2000). 
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International refugee law has acknowledged gender-related3 
forms of persecution since 1985.4  This influenced the drafters of the 
Rome Statute to include gender within the list of persecutory grounds 
 
 3. This article uses the term “gender-related” when referring to refugee law because this 
is the commonly used term in that field of law.  See, e.g., U. N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, 
Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Gender Guidelines].  This article 
uses the term “gender-based” when referring to international criminal law because the ICC’s 
Elements of Crimes interprets “on . . . gender . . . grounds” found in the Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 7(1)(h), as “based” on gender.  Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, 
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Addendum, Part II, 
Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, at 15, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 
2000) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes].  Despite the different terminology, gender-related and 
gender-based have similar meanings.  See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text. 
 4. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee issued a 
conclusion in 1985 which “[r]ecognized that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, were free 
to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment 
due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they lived may be 
considered as a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of Article 1 A, paragraph 2, of the 
1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.”  U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Report of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, Addendum to the Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶ 115(4)(k), U.N. Doc. A/40/12/Add.1 (Jan 
10, 1986) (This conclusion is commonly referred to as the Executive Committee’s Conclusion 
No. 39(XXXVI).) [hereinafter Conclusion No. 39].  Subsequent practice has indicated that while 
states are “free to adopt” this approach, the UNHCR views it as a correct approach.  See, for 
example, UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶¶ 28-31, for a discussion of gender-related 
claims under “particular social group” and the Guidelines as a whole for recognition that 
persecution may be gender-related.  The UNHCR’s Executive Committee has repeatedly urged 
states to recognize that persecution may be gender-related.  E.g., U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Report of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees on the Work of its Forty-Seventh Session, Addendum to the Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶ 21(o), U.N. Doc. A/51/12/Add.1 (Oct. 
16, 1996) (This conclusion is commonly referred to as the Executive Committee’s Conclusion 
No. 79(XLVII).); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Report of the Executive Committee of the 
Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Work of its Forty-
Eighth Session, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
¶ 17(t), U.N. Doc. A/52/12/Add.1 (Oct. 17, 1997) (This conclusion is commonly referred to as 
the Executive Committee’s Conclusion No. 81(XLVII).); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
Report of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees on the Work of its Fiftieth Session, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶ 20(n), U.N. Doc. A/54/12/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 1999) (This 
conclusion is commonly referred to as the Executive Committee’s Conclusion No. 87(L).); U.N. 
High Comm’r for Refugees, Report of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Work of its Fifty-Seventh Session, Addendum to 
the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶ 17(n)(iv), U.N. Doc. 
A/61/12/Add.1 (Oct. 6, 2006) (This conclusion is commonly referred to as the Executive 
Committee’s Conclusion No. 105.). 
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in the crimes against humanity provision.5  Thus, there is a close link 
between the development of international refugee law and 
international criminal law with respect to gendered aspects of 
persecution.  This link is helpful because international and domestic 
refugee law6 has explored certain elements of gender-related 
persecution that are, at present, unexplored in international criminal 
law.  Therefore, when the ICC’s judges are determining the content 
of the elements of the crime against humanity of gender-based 
persecution, they should examine principles or rules found within 
refugee law.7  This is not to argue that a definition of gender-related 
persecution found within international refugee law should be directly 
transferred to the crime against humanity of gender-based 
persecution.  The Kupreškić decision of International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) strongly cautions against 
such a direct transfer.8  Rather, the ICC should evaluate how refugee 
 
 5. See Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?, 18 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 59 (2005); Steains, supra note 2, at 370 n.41. 
 6. This Article refers both to international refugee law and domestic refugee law.  
International refugee law comprises both “hard” (binding) and “soft” (nonbinding but 
persuasive) law.  A central source of binding international refugee law is the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2554 [hereinafter Refugee 
Convention], as updated by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 8791.  These treaties do not directly address gender-related persecution.  Rather, 
gender-related persecution has been addressed through a combination of non-binding UNHCR-
issued documents and Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee.  Important standards 
on gender-related persecution include the 2002 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, and 
Conclusion No. 39, supra note 4.  For an explanation of the “soft law” status conclusions and 
guidelines on international refugee protection, see JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 112-18 (2005).  Domestic refugee law on gender-
based persecution comprises domestic legislation and decisions or case law.  In some 
jurisdictions, states have adopted guidelines to assist decision-makers with respect to gender-
based persecution.  See infra note 76. 
 7. When faced with a question that the Rome Statute, the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, and the Elements of Crimes do not answer, the ICC shall first apply “applicable 
treaties and principles and rules of international law,” and failing that, “general principles of law 
derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, 
the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided 
that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards.”  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b)-(c). 
 8. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 589 (Jan. 14, 2000).  The 
ICTY stated: 
It would be contrary to the principle of legality to convict someone of persecution 
based on a definition found in international refugee law or human rights law.  In these 
bodies of law the central determination to be made is whether the person claiming 
refugee status or likely to be expelled or deported has a “well founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”  The emphasis is more on the state of mind of the person 
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law approaches to gender-related persecution can shed considerable 
light on international criminal law’s relatively undeveloped 
understanding of gender-based persecution.  Even if the ICC decides 
that certain aspects of refugee law relating to gender-related 
persecution do not rise to the level of “principles and rules of 
international law” or general principles of domestic law, they may still 
help guide the ICC toward a full understanding of gender-based 
persecution.  As A. Widney Brown and Laura Grenfell have 
commented, “[w]hile it makes sense that refugee law and human 
rights law cannot be used to define persecution, such law can surely 
be used to aid interpretation where there is an absence of 
international criminal law jurisprudence . . . .”9 
The ICC must be careful when it seeks to determine general 
principles of law on gender-related persecution from domestic 
jurisprudence.  Feminist academic analysis has identified certain 
serious misinterpretations of the international refugee law on gender-
related persecution by domestic judges and administrators.10  In 
certain jurisdictions, governments have taken steps to prevent these 
misinterpretations through the introduction of laws or guidelines.11  In 
many cases, the decisions taken after the implementation of these 
steps have considerably improved the domestic level of analysis and 
understanding of gender-related persecution.12  Even in these 
 
claiming to have been persecuted (or to be vulnerable to persecution) than on the 
factual finding of whether persecution has occurred or may occur.  In addition, the 
intent of the persecutor is not relevant.  The result is that the net of “persecution” is 
cast much wider than is legally justified for the purposes of imposing individual 
criminal responsibility.  The definition stemming from international refugee law or 
human rights law cannot therefore be followed here. 
Id. (citations omitted).  This decision incorrectly classifies international refugee law as focusing 
on the state of mind of the refugee claimant when it in fact considers both the subjective and, 
perhaps even more so, the objective elements of a refugee claim.  See JAMES HATHAWAY, THE 
LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 65 (1991) [hereinafter HATHAWAY, LAW].  Hathaway argues that, 
unlike the characterization found in the Kupreškić case, the refugee determination process is 
inherently objective, as it “was intended to restrict the scope of protection to persons who can 
demonstrate a present or prospective risk of persecution, irrespective of the extent or nature of 
mistreatment, if any, that they have suffered in the past.”  Id.  Even so, see Kupreškić, Case No. 
IT-95-16-T, ¶ 589, which highlights that there are important differences between the underlying 
requirements for a refugee determination and a determination of guilt or innocence within 
international criminal law. 
 9. A. Widney Brown & Laura Grenfell, The International Crime of Gender-Based 
Persecution and the Taliban, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 347, 360-61 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 10. E.g., HEAVEN CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS ch. 2.1 (2001); 
THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STATUS ch. 5.3 (2000). 
 11. See, e.g., infra note 76. 
 12. CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 12-16.  See generally id., at 35-77 (proposing a standard 
framework for analysis of gender-related refugee claims based in part on gender-sensitive 
02__OOSTERVELD.DOC 3/9/2007  10:02 AM 
2006] GENDER, PERSECUTION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 53 
jurisdictions, however, there are decisions that appear not to conform 
to the laws or guidelines.13  There is a rich feminist academic literature 
within refugee law that has analyzed how many domestic refugee 
decision-makers have failed to understand the meaning of “gender”; 
the link between gender, discrimination, and persecution; and how 
acts that may appear to some decision-makers to be “private,” and 
therefore not persecutory acts, are actually acts of gender-related 
persecution.  The ICC must take these critiques into account if it is to 
determine general principles of domestic refugee law correctly and 
sensitively. 
In addition, feminist academic writing has identified questions 
that have not yet been adequately addressed within international 
refugee law or domestic refugee decisions.  For example, is 
persecution because of gender different from persecution of a person 
as a woman or man?  Do these distinctions matter?  These questions 
are relevant to the ICC, in part because it will need to delineate the 
scope of gender-based persecution, and in part because the difference 
in terminology between international refugee law—which tends to 
refer to gender-related persecution—and international criminal law—
which criminalized gender-based persecution—raises the issue of 
whether these two areas of the law are addressing the same kind of 
violations or not. 
This Article begins by examining the current state of the crime 
against humanity of persecution under international criminal law, 
including international case law of potential relevance to gender-
based persecution.  Next, this Article examines how refugee law can 
and should help inform the ICC’s analysis of gender-based 
persecution.  Each ICC crime is accompanied by detailed elements.14  
For gender-based persecution, there are two key elements that, when 
combined, differentiate this kind of persecution from persecution 
based on other grounds:  the element that “[t]he perpetrator severely 
deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of 
fundamental rights”15 and the element that the perpetrator’s targeting 
 
refugee determination decisions in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and 
elsewhere). 
 13. E.g., SPIJKERBOER, supra note 10, at 101-05, 172-80. 
 14. The Rome Statute is accompanied by a non-binding document, Elements of Crimes, 
separating out the specific elements that the Prosecutor can be expected to prove for every 
Rome Statute crime.  See Elements of Crimes, supra note 3. 
 15. Id. art. 7(1)(h). 
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was based on gender.16  International and domestic refugee law has 
scrutinized the issue of what amounts to a gender-related severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights.  While not all refugee law 
examples of such severe deprivation may be applicable within the 
crimes against humanity context, they do help to illustrate that 
gendered violations are wide-ranging, and are not restricted to acts of 
sexual violence such as rape.  In addition, refugee law has 
demonstrated the complex relationship between discrimination 
(including discrimination against women that is ubiquitous and 
frequent) and persecution, which will benefit the ICC as it contends 
with the same issue.  Central to distinguishing between discrimination 
and persecution is a determination of whether acts are “public” or 
“private” in nature.  Feminist academic commentators have critiqued 
domestic refugee decision-makers’ mischaracterization of certain 
gender-related acts as “personal” and therefore “private” and as 
leading to the unfortunate denial of refugee status to certain 
claimants.  The ICC must be aware of such critiques so that it may 
avoid making the same mischaracterizations made by domestic 
refugee decision-makers, and because the determination of what is a 
“public” and therefore potentially persecutory act is interlinked with 
the ICC’s understanding of the phrase “context of society” within the 
Rome Statute’s definition of “gender.” 
The other key element of crime, that the targeting was based on 
gender,17 is the very core of the crime against humanity of gender-
based persecution.  Refugee law has grappled with the question of 
what “gender” is in ways that can assist the ICC as it examines the 
same question.  Refugee law’s successes and failures on this front 
provide critical guidance to the ICC as it addresses various legal and 
conceptual challenges.  These include avoiding the conflation of “sex” 
and “gender”; understanding the multifaceted, complex, and 
situation-specific nature of gender; discerning the connection between 
sexual identity and gender; perceiving where gender overlaps with 
other identities that may also be grounds under the Rome Statute 
definition; and deciding whether it is important to differentiate 
between what amounts to persecution because of gender and 
persecution of a woman (or man) as a woman (or man). 
Refugee law contains important principles or rules that can be 
applied (but not transferred) by the ICC to the crime against 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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humanity of gender-based persecution.  Additionally, academic 
commentary on refugee law can helpfully guide the ICC in three 
ways.  First, the commentary provides insight into refugee decision-
makers’ approaches to persecution as a severe deprivation of rights 
and the meaning of targeting based on gender.  Second, the 
commentary identifies domestic decisions that have deviated from 
internationally recognized norms and standards with respect to 
gender-based persecution.18  Finally, the commentators frame 
questions that the ICC should ask during its analysis of gender-based 
persecution.  Therefore, this Article concludes that refugee law is 
crucially relevant to the ICC’s determination of what amounts to 
gender-based persecution. 
The connection between international criminal law and refugee 
law on the issue of gender-based persecution is not only of import to 
the ICC.  The complementary19 nature of the Rome Statute has led 
many jurisdictions to implement the ICC’s crimes—including that of 
gender-based persecution—into domestic legislation.20  Thus, these 
same jurisdictions may need to consider how their domestic refugee 
decisions on gender-related persecution may assist in interpreting the 
ICC in implementing legislation.  Australia’s “Guidelines on Gender 
Issues for Decision Makers” on refugee and humanitarian visa 
applications correctly notes that “[g]ender-based persecution is 
sometimes more subtle than other forms” of persecution.21  Such 
subtlety will require domestic decision-makers and courts to take a 
particularly nuanced approach to examining the crime against 
 
 18. These decisions, therefore, should not be taken into account by the ICC when deriving 
general principles of law.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(c). 
 19. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC is essentially a court of last resort.  A case is not 
admissible if (1) it is “being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless that state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”; 
(2) it has “been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided 
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute”; (3) the “person concerned has already been tried 
for conduct which is the subject of the complaint”; or (4) the “case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court.”  Id. art. 17. 
 20. E.g., Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24, §§ 4, 6 (Can.); 
International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, 2000 S.N.Z. No. 26 § 10 
(N.Z.); Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 
§ 4 (S. Afr.); International Criminal Court Act, 2001, ch. 17, § 50 (U.K.). 
 21. DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTL., REFUGEE AND 
HUMANITARIAN VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS 
¶ 4.10 (1996) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN GENDER GUIDELINES].  Sometimes, gender-based 
persecution is perceived as more subtle than other forms of persecution simply because 
decision-makers do not understand how to do a gender-based analysis. 
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humanity of gender-based persecution, while at the same time 
drawing on or distinguishing decisions on gender-related persecution 
found in domestic refugee law. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PERSECUTION 
Persecution as a crime against humanity was first codified in 
international criminal law in the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, which limited the crime to political, racial, or religious 
grounds.22  The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East also included the crime against humanity of persecution, but 
limited the prohibited grounds to political or racial.23  Control Council 
Law No. 10 provided the basis for the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union to prosecute individuals in 
Germany who had not come before the International Military 
Tribunal.24  This law included “persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of 
the country where perpetrated” as crimes against humanity.25  The 
Statute of the ICTY partly followed these precedents by including the 
crime against humanity of “persecutions on political, racial and 
religious grounds.”26  The Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) contains the same act, but adds a 
persecutory element, requiring that the crime against humanity be 
committed not only “as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population,” but also as an attack be based on 
“national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”27 
Persecution is defined in the Rome Statute as the “intentional 
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or 
 
 22. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, in the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
 23. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5, Apr. 26, 1946, 4 
Bevans 27 (replacing the original Charter, Jan. 19, 1946, 4 Bevans 20). 
 24. See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
against Peace and against Humanity, Jan. 20, 1946, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CONTROL 
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50. 
 25. Id. art. II(1)(c). 
 26. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal art. 5(h), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 27. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1602 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].  Commentators have noted that this formulation 
does not reflect customary international law.  See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes 
Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 46 (1993). 
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collectivity.”28  Persecution is prohibited “against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender . . . , or other grounds that are universally recognized 
as impermissible under international law in connection with [any 
other crime against humanity] . . . or any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.”29  Persecutory grounds were reproduced in the Rome 
Statute from those mentioned in earlier precedents—political, racial, 
national, ethnic, and religious—and three new grounds were added: 
gender, cultural, and “other grounds that are universally recognized 
as impermissible under international law.”30  Persecution was not 
defined in any of the earlier precedents and there was very little 
applicable ICTY or ICTR case law at that time,31 prompting some 
delegates who negotiated the Rome Statute to request that a clear 
definition be adopted.  They were worried that this crime might be 
interpreted by an activist Court to include any discriminatory 
practice, thereby turning the ICC from a criminal into a human rights 
court.32  A definition was drafted to indicate that persecution had a 
specific threshold, resulting from the “intentional and severe 
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law.”33  In 
addition, persecutory acts were required to be connected with other 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.34  This high threshold of 
intention, severe deprivation, and required connection to other ICC 
crimes provided comfort to these states, which then agreed to the 
inclusion of persecution as a prohibited act.35 
Another point of concern expressed by some conservative states 
was that the term “gender” in the list of persecutory grounds was not 
defined.36  Their fears reiterated the fears initially raised prior to the 
 
 28. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(g). 
 29. Id. art. 7(1)(h). 
 30. Id.; see also Georg Witschel & Wiebke Rückert, Article 7(1)(h)—Crime Against 
Humanity of Persecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 94, 95 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (explaining that this 
was done to bring the Rome Statute “up-to-date”). 
 31. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Opinion & Judgment (May 7, 1997), noted 
in Witschel & Rückert, supra note 30, at 94-97 (explaining that at the time, only the ICTY 
judgment in Tadić addressed this crime). 
 32. Robinson, supra note 27, at 53. 
 33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(g). 
 34. Id. art. 7(1)(h). 
 35. See Robinson, supra note 27, at 54. 
 36. For example, the representative from Azerbaijan indicated that his delegation was 
concerned about the use of imprecise terminology, such as the word “gender.”  U.N. Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Comm. of the 
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1995 United Nations World Conference on Women.37  Their 
apprehension centered on whether recognition of the term “gender” 
creates human rights based on sexual orientation or could lead to 
classification of certain laws and practices that affect women in their 
countries as crimes against humanity.38  “Gender” was first included 
as a prohibited ground of persecution in the Rome Statute’s crimes 
against humanity draft text in February 1997, following international 
refugee law’s recognition of gender as grounds for persecution.39  At 
that time, the term “gender” was put in brackets40 as part of the 
debate over whether to include an illustrative (open-ended) list of 
prohibited grounds of persecution, or an exhaustive (closed) list.41  
The reference to “gender” was left in brackets throughout the 
remaining preparatory negotiations42 and much of the U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
 
Whole, 25th mtg. ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 (July 8, 1998) [hereinafter Summary 
Record of the 25th Meeting].  See also U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Comm. of the Whole, 27th mtg. ¶ 22, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27 (July 8, 1998) (comments of the representative from Bahrain); 
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal 
Court, Comm. of the Whole, 28th mtg. ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28 (July 8,1998) 
(comments of the representative from Kuwait). 
 37. The Holy See, certain Arab states, and conservative nongovernmental organizations 
had opposed the undefined use of the term “gender” in the outcome document of the Fourth 
World Conference on Women, the Beijing Platform for Action, with the latter group 
characterizing gender as a “profoundly elastic term, encapsulating a broad feminist rights 
strategy that includes abortion.”  DORIS BUSS & DIDI HERMAN, GLOBALIZING FAMILY 
VALUES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 113 (2003).  See Doris E. Buss, 
Robes, Relics and Rights: The Vatican and the Beijing Conference on Women, 7 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 339, 348-51 (1998); Dianne Otto, Lesbians? Not in My Country, 20 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 
288, 289-90 (1995). 
 38. See comments by the delegate from Azerbaijan, asking if a gender-based persecution 
provision could “imply that a conviction by a national court for homosexual acts might be 
regarded as persecution and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the Court as a crime against 
humanity.”  Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, supra note 36, ¶ 61.  See also Oosterveld, 
supra note 5, at 63, 65-66. 
 39. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 59.  See Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held 
from 11 to 21 February 1997, at 4, 5 n.7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (Mar. 12, 1997). 
 40. In international negotiations, square brackets are used to indicate text that has not 
achieved acceptance by consensus. 
 41. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 59 n.24.  In other words, the bracketing of the term 
“gender” at that time did not relate to the concerns eventually raised at the Diplomatic 
Conference. 
 42. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l 
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 
14, 1998). 
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an International Criminal Court (Diplomatic Conference).43  The 
definition of “gender” became the subject of lengthy and contentious 
negotiations during the Diplomatic Conference,44 which, once 
resolved in the final days of the Conference, led to the acceptance of 
gender as a prohibited ground within the crime of persecution.45 
Undoubtedly, the ICC will refer to earlier case law on the crime 
against humanity of persecution when analyzing whether acts amount 
to gender-based persecution under the Rome Statute.  The ICTY and 
ICTR have both examined the crime of persecution in some detail.46  
The ICTY has defined the required elements of the crime of 
persecution as consisting of an act or omission which does the 
following: 
1. [D]iscriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a 
fundamental right laid down in international customary or 
treaty law (the actus reus); and 
2. was carried out deliberately with the intention to 
discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, 
religion or politics (the mens rea).47 
 
 43. For examples of lack of consensus, see sources cited supra note 36.  See also U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, 
Comm. of the Whole, 3d mtg. ¶¶ 161-63, 166-69, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3 (June 17, 
1998) (illustrating Italy and Ireland arguing to maintain the term “gender” in the crime against 
humanity of persecution); U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the 
Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Comm. of the Whole, 4th mtg. ¶¶ 24-26, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (June 17, 1998) (illustrating Israel arguing to maintain the term “gender” 
in the crime against humanity of persecution); U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Crimes 
Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, Recommendations of the Coordinator, at 2 n.2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.44  (July 7, 1998) (indicating a placeholder definition for “gender,” since the 
definition was still being discussed). 
 44. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 58-66. 
 45. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l 
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Working Group on Applicable 
Law, at 1, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/WGAL/L.2/Add.1 (July 14, 1998) (indicating agreement 
that “gender” be defined as the following:  “For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that 
the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society.  The 
term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from above”). 
 46. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Opinion & Judgment, ¶ 345 (May 7, 
1997); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 621 (Jan. 14, 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 634 (Mar. 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 1072 (Dec. 3, 2003). 
 47. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T,  Judgment, ¶ 431 (Mar. 15, 2002); 
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Sept. 17, 2003) (quoting 
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, ¶ 431); Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 320 (Feb. 28, 2005) (quoting Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, ¶ 185); Prosecutor v. 
Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 113 (Feb. 25, 2004) (quoting Krnojelac, Case No. 
IT-97-25-A, ¶ 185); Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 131 (July 29, 2004) 
02__OOSTERVELD.DOC 3/9/2007  10:02 AM 
60 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:49 
While the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR do not provide for the 
crime against humanity of gender-based persecution,48 certain 
Tribunal cases have dealt with persecutory acts that have a gender 
component.49  These cases provide the ICC with a starting point for 
analysis of gender-based persecution.  The ICTR, in Nahimana, 
addressed the relationship between gender identities and persecution 
on political or racial/ethnic grounds.50  In Nahimana, the Trial 
Chamber found that the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des 
Milles Collines (RTLM), the newspaper Kangura, and the political 
party Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) “essentially 
merged political and ethnic identity, defining their political target on 
the basis of [Tutsi] ethnicity and political positions relating to 
ethnicity.”51  Tutsi women were portrayed as “femmes fatale . . . 
seductive agents of the enemy.”52  This definition of Tutsi women 
“made the sexual attack and killing of Tutsi women a foreseeable 
consequence of the role attributed to them.”53 
The ICTY has also explored the intersection of gender with 
racially-, religiously-, and politically-based persecution.  The Krstić 
judgment found that acts of sexual violence could constitute 
persecution when committed with the required discriminatory intent 
based on race, religion, or politics.54  In that case, rapes were 
considered incidental as opposed to systematic crimes, but were still 
 
(quoting Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, ¶ 185); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 101 (Dec. 17, 2004) (quoting Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, ¶ 131); Prosecutor v. 
Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 109 (July 20, 2005) (quoting 
Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, ¶ 131).  The ICTR has defined the material elements of 
persecution somewhat differently as: “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of 
a fundamental right, laid down in customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as 
the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [on crimes against humanity].”  Nahimana, Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 1072; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment & Sentence,  
¶ 21 (June 1, 2000). 
 48. See generally ICTY Statute, supra note 26; ICTR Statute, supra note 27. 
 49. See Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 1079 (addressing persecution of Tutsi 
women). 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. ¶ 1071. 
 52. Id. ¶ 1079. 
 53. Id.  Another helpful observation, though not focused on persecution per se, comes from 
the Akayesu Trial Chamber of the ICTR, which found that targeting Tutsi women for sexual 
violence was an act of genocide against the Tutsi group as a whole.  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) (finding the acts against Tutsis amounted to 
genocide, a crime that included a definition of “group” similar to that for persecution). 
 54. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 617-18 (Aug. 2, 2001) 
(including rape as one of a number a crimes that when directed against Bosnian Muslims 
constituted persecution). 
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found to be a foreseeable consequence of persecution committed as 
part of a joint criminal enterprise.55  As Patricia Viseaur Sellers noted, 
“That wartime sexual assault crimes are ostensibly characterized as 
the natural and foreseeable consequence of other violations [such as 
persecution] is landmark jurisprudence.”56  In Prosecutor v. Kvočka, 
the defendants were found guilty of persecution carried out through 
rape and sexual assault.57  The Trial Chamber linked the issue of 
persecution with sexual violence, finding that, in light of the clear 
intent of those operating the Omarska camp to subject non-Serbs to 
persecution through violence and humiliation, “it would be unrealistic 
and contrary to all rational logic to expect that none of the women 
held in Omarska, placed in circumstances rendering them especially 
vulnerable, would be subjected to rape or other forms of sexual 
violence.”58  Therefore, any crimes that were natural or foreseeable 
consequences of the joint criminal enterprise of the Omarska camp, 
including persecutory sexual violence, can be attributed to 
participants in the criminal enterprise if committed during the time 
they participated in the enterprise.59  On appeal, accused Radić 
asserted that the acts of rape and sexual violence charged did not 
involve discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, or political belief.60  
He submitted that “the Trial Chamber found personal motives in the 
acts of rape as persecution, but failed to establish what constituted his 
discriminatory intent.”61  The Appeals Chamber stated that Radić’s 
 
 55. Patricia Viseur Sellers, Individual(s’) Liability for Collective Sexual Violence, in 
GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153, 184 (Karen Knop ed., 2004) (citing Krstić, Case No. IT-98-
33-T, ¶ 617). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 752, 755, 758, 761, 764 
(Nov. 2, 2001).  On appeal, Kvočka’s conviction for persecution through rape and sexual assault 
was overturned.  The Appeals Chamber found that the “Trial Chamber had erred in stating that 
the rape and sexual assault with which Kvočka was charged were committed in Omarska during 
the time he was employed there.”  Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment,  
¶ 334 (Feb. 28, 2005).  See also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 1008 
(Sept. 1, 2004) (finding that the act of rape is of sufficient gravity to constitute persecution).  
The Tribunal also noted that sexual assault, such as forced sex between detainees, running a 
knife along a Bosnian Muslim female detainee’s breast, or forcing a Bosnian Croat woman to 
undress herself in front of cheering Bosnian Serb police officers and soldiers, can amount to 
persecution.  Id. ¶¶ 1012-13.  See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 806 
(July 31, 2003), for similar findings. 
 58. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, ¶ 327. 
 59. Id.  Sellers notes that this test is natural or foreseable, whereas the Krstić test was 
natural and forseeable.  Sellers, supra note 55, at 186. 
 60. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, ¶ 369. 
 61. Id. 
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claim did not properly distinguish between intent and motive:  “the 
Trial Chamber found that the sexual violence was directed only 
against women of non-Serb origin, and Radić does not contest this 
finding.  It was . . . reasonable to conclude that Radić acted with the 
required discriminatory intent, notwithstanding his personal motives 
for committing these acts.”62  The Appeals Chamber reiterates this 
point later in its judgment, noting that “personal motives, such as 
settling old scores, or seeking personal gain, do not exclude 
discriminatory intent.”63 
Thus, the case law of the ICTY and ICTR can provide some 
guidance to the ICC on gender-based persecution.  While neither of 
the Tribunals’ cases specifically analyze the distinct ground of gender-
based persecution, they clearly illustrate a number of important 
themes:  gender intersects with racial, religious, and political 
identities; gender identity, as negatively defined by the perpetrator(s), 
can inexorably lead to persecutory targeting on the basis of gender; 
other prohibited acts under crimes against humanity or war crimes 
can be inextricably linked to sexual (and therefore gender-specific) 
acts; and, while perpetrators can have personal motives for carrying 
out sexual violence, these personal motives do not negate the overall 
discriminatory intent behind gender-specific persecutory acts.  These 
are all important lessons, but they only illuminate some of the 
required elements of gender-based persecution as set forth in the 
ICC’s Elements of Crimes document.  It is helpful, therefore, for the 
ICC to look at the only area of international law that has explored 
persecution on gender grounds in detail:  international refugee law, 
and the related domestic implementation of that law. 
II.  ELEMENTS OF PERSECUTION ON GENDER GROUNDS: 
GUIDANCE FROM REFUGEE LAW 
The ICC’s Elements of Crimes document lists the elements that 
the ICC’s Prosecutor can be expected to prove in order to support a 
crime against humanity charge.64  While these elements are not 
 
 62. Id. ¶ 370 (citations omitted).  Note that, in international criminal law, intent and 
motivation are distinct, and intent is part of mens rea, while motivation is not.  See Prosecutor v. 
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 95 (June 7, 2001) (“It is worth noting that 
the motives (as distinct from the intent) of the Accused are not of relevance to the legal 
constitution of a crime against humanity.”). 
 63. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, ¶ 463. 
 64. Elements of Crimes, supra note 3. 
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binding,65 they are the result of multilateral negotiation, and the 
Prosecutor, defense, and judges will likely refer to them extensively.66  
Although there are six elements listed for the crime against humanity 
of persecution,67 the crux of gender-based persecution can be found in 
two separate, but interrelated, elements.  The first key element of the 
crime against humanity of gender-based persecution is that “[t]he 
perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or 
more persons of fundamental rights.”68  With this element, the ICC 
will be the first international criminal tribunal to evaluate what 
amounts to an exclusively gender-based deprivation of fundamental 
rights.  The second key element is that the perpetrator’s targeting was 
based on gender grounds.69  With this element, the ICC will again be 
the first international criminal tribunal to determine the meaning of 
“gender” as a ground for persecution.  Refugee law can assist in the 
elucidation of both elements, and therefore should be drawn upon as 
an interpretive aid. 
 
 65. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9 (stating that “Elements of Crimes shall assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application of” the crimes provisions). 
 66. See Herman von Hebel, The Decision to Include Elements of Crimes in the Rome 
Statute, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 4, 8 (“Of course, while the elements are not 
binding per se, they will have persuasive force, reflecting the consensus view of the international 
community; ultimately, however, judges will have to reach their own understanding of the 
statute.”). 
 67. Elements of Crimes, supra note 3, at 15.  The elements are: 
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons 
of fundamental rights. 
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group 
or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such. 
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the [Rome] Statute, or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law. 
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the [Rome] Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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A. Severe Deprivation of Fundamental Rights 
1. Violations of Fundamental Rights.  The first element requires 
that the perpetrator severely deprive, contrary to international law, 
one or more persons of fundamental rights.  The question therefore 
arises of how to define “fundamental rights” in the context of gender-
based persecution.  Case law of the ICTY and ICTR can provide 
some limited assistance in this respect.  The ICTY has found that 
“there is no comprehensive list of acts” (which include omissions) 
that amount to violations of fundamental rights.70  The acts may be 
those listed in the genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
provisions of the ICTY Statute, and may also include acts not 
enumerated in the Statute, such as those involving “physical or 
mental harm or infringements upon individual freedom.”71  The ICTY 
has determined that all acts must be examined in context because a 
single act that may not on its own amount to a violation of 
fundamental rights (and therefore persecution) may do so when 
considered in light of a number of acts.72 
The Tribunals have determined that a number of acts can 
amount to a deprivation of fundamental rights:  rape and sexual 
assault; destruction of property or means of subsistence; attack or 
destruction of towns, villages, and cities; use of hostages as human 
shields; destruction and damage of religious or educational 
institutions; unlawful detention, deportation, or forcible transfer of 
civilians; harassment, humiliation, and psychological abuse; murder, 
extermination, and torture; attacks on political, social, or economic 
rights; and violations of the rights to life, liberty, and security of the 
person—not to be held in slavery or servitude; not to be subjected to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and 
not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, exile, or 
imprisonment.73 
 
 70. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Nov. 29, 2002). 
 71. Id.; see Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 605-06 (Jan. 14, 
2000); see also Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Nov. 2, 2001). 
 72. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 622; Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, ¶ 247. 
 73. Examples of the deprivation of fundamental rights have been identified by the ICTY.  
See Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶¶ 600, 615; see also Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-
33-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001); Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, ¶¶ 186, 190; Prosecutor v. 
Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 202-207 (Feb. 26, 2001); Prosecutor v. Blaskić, 
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 220, 227, 233, 234 (Mar. 3, 2000).  Examples have also been 
identified by the ICTR.  See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment & 
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While these acts may have gendered components—the most 
obvious being rape and other forms of sexual violence—there is very 
little analysis in the existing Tribunal case law as to what specific 
violations of fundamental rights might result in gender-based 
persecution.  International refugee law can provide assistance in this 
respect.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ 
(UNHCR) 2002 Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution note that, 
There is no doubt that rape and other forms of gender-related 
violence, such as dowry-related violence, female genital mutilation, 
domestic violence, and trafficking, are acts which inflict severe pain 
and suffering—both mental and physical—and which have been 
used as forms of persecution, whether perpetrated by State or 
private actors.74 
In addition, these UNHCR Gender Guidelines identify 
discrimination on account of one’s sexual orientation as potentially 
amounting to persecution because “the claimant has refused to 
adhere to socially or culturally defined roles or expectations of 
behaviour attributed to his or her sex.”75 
Several countries have issued documents that are designed to 
either bind or assist asylum decision-makers in determining whether 
certain acts amount to gender-related persecution.76  Canada’s 
Guidelines, Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related 
Persecution, identify the following as potentially falling into the 
gender-related persecution category:  severe discrimination on 
 
Sentence, ¶ 1071-72 (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment & 
Sentence, ¶ 22 (June 1, 2000). 
 74. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 9 (footnote omitted).  See also id. ¶ 18 
(providing more detail on trafficking). 
 75. Id. ¶ 16. 
 76. E.g., AUSTRALIAN GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, ¶¶ 1.1-2.4; CANADIAN 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD., WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-
RELATED PERSECUTION, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 
65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: UPDATE (1996) [hereinafter CANADIAN GENDER 
GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASYLUM OFFICERS 
ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS FROM WOMEN (1995) [hereinafter U.S. GENDER 
CONSIDERATIONS]; UNITED KINGDOM HOME OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES IN THE ASYLUM 
CLAIM (2004) [hereinafter UK GENDER GUIDELINES].  See also U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Dep’t of Int’l Prot., and Reg’l Bureau for 
Europe, Comparative Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in National Asylum Legislation 
and Practice in Europe, ¶¶ 78-84, 97-123, U.N. Doc. EPAU/2004/05 (May 2004) (prepared by 
Heaven Crawley & Trine Lester) [hereinafter Crawley & Lester]; SPIJKERBOER, supra note 10, 
at 3.  While the Canadian Gender Guidelines are, in theory, not binding, Canadian cases have 
ruled that a decision can be overturned if the Guidelines are not followed.  E.g., Elezi v. 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2003] F.C. 210 (Can.). 
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grounds of gender, domestic violence, violence directed against a 
woman in civil war, and acts directed against women as a 
consequence of their failing to conform to, or for transgressing, 
certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and 
practices in their country of origin.77  The Canadian Guidelines also 
observe that circumstances which give rise to women’s fear of 
persecution are often unique to women and could include “rape, . . . 
infanticide, genital mutilation, bride burning, forced marriage, 
domestic violence, forced abortion or compulsory sterilization.”78  
These Guidelines also recommend that adjudicators refer to a 
number of human rights instruments when determining what 
constitutes prohibited or permissible conduct towards women, an 
approach which is also helpful for the ICC’s consideration of the 
phrase “contrary to international law.”79 
Other documents refer to similar examples of acts that amount to 
gender-based persecution.80  The United States’ Considerations for 
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women adds 
slavery to the examples identified in the Canadian Guidelines,81 while 
the United Kingdom’s Guidance on Gender Issues in the Asylum 
Claim more specifically mentions domestic slavery.82  Australia’s 
Guidelines, Gender Issues for Decision Makers, also cite systematic 
rape “used as part of ethnic cleansing,” “societal oppression of 
women,” and “denial of participation by women in political, civil or 
economic life” as examples of potentially persecutory acts.83  The 
Swedish Migration Board’s Gender Guidelines mention “physical, 
sexual and psychological abuse occurring [within] the family,” such as 
sexual abuse of female children, dowry-related violence, “non-spousal 
violence and violence related to exploitation[;] . . . physical, sexual or 
psychological violence occurring within the general community [such 
as] rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in 
educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and 
 
 77. CANADIAN GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 76, § A(I). 
 78. Id. § B. 
 79. See id. 
 80. U.S. GENDER CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 76, ¶ 9; U.K. GENDER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 76, ¶¶ 3-5; AUSTRALIAN GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, ¶¶ 4.5-4.10. 
 81. U.S. GENDER CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 76, ¶ 9. 
 82. U.K. GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 76, ¶ 3. 
 83. AUSTRALIAN GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, ¶¶ 4.7-4.10. 
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forced prostitution; and physical, sexual and psychological violence 
perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.”84 
Numerous domestic cases have reiterated that these examples or 
categories of acts can indeed amount to gender-related persecution.85  
Deborah Anker notes that there is a growing body of refugee case 
law considering forms of violence against women such as rape,86 
female genital surgeries,87 domestic violence,88 “forced marriage, 
forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced prostitution, bride 
burning and honor killings, [as well as gender-discriminatory] denials 
of education, employment and health care.”89  Heaven Crawley and 
Trine Lester also describe domestic cases involving other examples of 
gender-related persecution:  for example, the “threat [to a woman] of 
a complete loss of a minimum subsistence level upon return”;90 
married women under threat because they had been unfaithful and 
left their country of origin without their husband’s permission;91 
serious discrimination such as that under the Taliban in Afghanistan;92 
sexual exploitation and trafficking;93 transgression of social or 
religious mores governing women and men;94 and persecution based 
on transsexuality.95  While not all of the examples gleaned from the 
UNHCR Gender Guidelines, domestic policy, and domestic decisions 
 
 84. Crawley & Lester, supra note 76, ¶ 152.  Crawley and Lester state that the Swedish 
Gender Guidelines define female genital mutilation and forced abortion as the only two forms 
of abuses that are exclusively gender-specific, on the basis that they only affect women.  Id.   
¶ 155.  “This implies a very narrow view of gender which actually refers to sex rather than 
socially constructed gender roles and circumstances.”  Id.  ¶ 156. 
 85. See generally, e.g., CRAWLEY, supra note 10, chs. 4-9 (describing the numerous 
domestic decisions). 
 86. Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 133, 140-43 (2002) [hereinafter Anker, Refugee Law]. 
 87. Id. at 143-46. 
 88. Id. at 146-49. 
 89. Id. at 150.  Anker also cites examples of case law.  Id. at 150 n.95.  See also Melanie 
Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 291 (2002); see also Stephen M. Knight, Seeking Asylum from Gender 
Persecution: Progress Amid Uncertainty, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 689 (2002). 
 90. Crawley & Lester, supra note 76, ¶ 179. 
 91. Id. ¶ 181. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 185, 193. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 206, 217. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 324, 331-33. 
 95. Id. ¶ 380. 
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may be applicable in the context of crimes against humanity,96 the 
range of violations identified as persecutory in refugee law certainly 
helps identify the complex relationship between discrimination, 
persecution, and gender and highlights actions that should at least be 
considered by the ICC’s Prosecutor and judges as potentially 
violating fundamental rights.  Refugee law’s understanding of acts 
that amount to gender-related persecution has clearly grown over 
time, as will the ICC’s, but the ICC can start from a very different and 
more informed point. 
These examples from refugee law, however, cannot provide 
specific guidance to the ICC on how to analyze the category of 
“gender” in specific situations.  “Gender” is not a discrete ground of 
persecution under the Refugee Convention, which is restricted to the 
grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.97  Given that “gender” is not a 
specific ground, it is therefore to be considered under each of these 
grounds.98  In practice, refugee decision-makers have tended to 
classify claimants within rather narrow gender-related sub-categories 
of those grounds.  Examples of these sub-categories include, “young 
women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM 
[female genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose 
the practice”;99 “married women living in a household which did not 
include a male blood relation to whom the women might look for 
protection against violence by the members of the household”;100 and 
“women in El Salvador abused by a perceived partner, a rebuffed ex-
boyfriend.”101  Randall has convincingly argued that this practice 
within domestic refugee law “has created [a] mechanistic and 
reductive classification problem . . . [leading to] artificial and ossified 
sub-categories.”102  This “super-categorization” results in decisions 
 
 96. This is because crimes against humanity have a minimum threshold of acts “committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.”  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
 97. Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2). 
 98. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶¶ 22-23. 
 99. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996) (U.S.).  See Randall, 
supra note 89, at 290. 
 100. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 210 C.L.R. 1, ¶ 81 
(McHugh and Gummow, JJ) (Austl.).  Judge Kirby classified the group in this way:  “there may 
be a particularly vulnerable group of married women in Pakistan, in dispute with their husbands 
and their husbands’ families, unable to call on male support and subjected to . . . [threats].”  Id. 
¶ 129 
 101. In re Q.A.E., C.R.D.D. No. 85 (2000) (Can.). 
 102. Randall, supra note 89, at 290. 
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that often “fail to grapple” with the full implications of gender as a 
consideration within the Convention refugee grounds.103  Since the 
Rome Statute recognizes gender as a separate, prohibited persecutory 
ground, the ICC need not delve into refugee law’s categorizations and 
sub-categorizations of gender, which are unique to that area of the 
law.  The ICC instead can take guidance from refugee decisions as to 
the variety and kinds of actions that might amount to the crimes 
against humanity of gender-based persecution. 
2. Ensuring Proper Delineation of “Public” Violations.  Similar 
to international criminal prosecutions, refugee status inquiries are 
“deeply and necessarily contextualized,”104 and those involving an 
analysis of gender identity are no different.  As Anthea Roberts notes 
in the refugee context, “[w]omen may experience distinct 
vulnerabilities created by their numerous overlapping identities.”105  It 
is for this reason that the UNHCR’s 2002 Gender Guidelines urge 
that refugee status determinations be approached “holistically,” 
having “regard to all the relevant circumstances” relating to the 
person making the claim.106  Thus, the challenge for the ICC’s 
Prosecutor and judges, as with refugee decision-makers, is to give full 
effect to the individualized and intersecting nature of the inquiry.107 
While some domestic refugee decisions have analyzed gender 
and other intersecting identities in the way envisioned by the 
UNHCR’s Gender Guidelines, academic commentators have 
critiqued numerous decisions as having misunderstood or 
mischaracterized intersectionality,108 with the result that many women 
who should otherwise have been granted refugee status are denied 
 
 103. See id. at 291, 296. 
 104. Anker, Refugee Law, supra note 86, at 150. 
 105. Anthea Roberts, Gender and Refugee Law, 22 AUSTL. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 159, 188 (2002).  
See also Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 
213, 263 (1995).  Alice Edwards provides the example of forced marriage of girls, which overlays 
age and gender considerations.  Alice Edwards, Age and Gender Dimensions in International 
Refugee Law, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 46, 57 (Erika Feller, Volker Türk & 
Frances Nicholson eds., 2003). 
 106. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 7. 
 107. Alice Edwards notes that the real challenge is to give “true effect to the individualized 
nature of the [refugee] inquiry,” which is cross-cutting.  Edwards, supra note 105, at 48. 
 108. Kimberlé Crenshaw’s groundbreaking work on intersectionality has heavily influenced 
international feminist legal analysis.  See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, in THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 93, 93-118 (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
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this status.109  For example, some refugee law decision-makers have 
misunderstood women’s political relationship with the state.  Some 
decision-makers have equated “political” with “public” in the context 
of two determinations:  first, in order to examine the acts of the 
claimant’s alleged persecutor, and second, to define the claimant’s 
own identity.110  In the first example, refugee decision-makers have 
incorrectly deemed certain acts by an alleged persecutor as 
“personal,” and therefore not amounting to persecution, because the 
acts occurred in “private” contexts, such as spousal relationships.  The 
assumption, however, of what is a “private” context is intensely 
gendered, and has been critiqued as such by feminist academic 
refugee law commentators.111  They have noted that these types of 
decisions are premised on the view that harm in what has traditionally 
been understood as the “private” sphere is, by its nature, perpetrated 
for personal reasons, thereby missing the overarching structural 
gendered patterns and dynamics.112  This problematic assumption is 
not limited to refugee law.  International human rights law has been 
criticized as privileging a masculine world view because it provides 
international regulation of actions only in the “public” or state-
governed sphere, leaving many harms that women are subjected to in 
the “private” or non-state spheres of business, home, and family 
unregulated and not considered true legal concerns.113 
 
 109. For cases that have followed the approach of the UHCR Gender Guidelines, see 
Anker, Refugee Law, supra note 86, at 141.  For cases that did not take intersectionality into 
account, see id. at 140.  For UK decisions that dealt with intersectionality on appeal, see 
CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 73-77. 
 110. Crawley provides a sophisticated analysis as to why ‘political’ has been mapped onto 
‘public’ in some refugee decisions, which is related to the centrality of the public/private binary 
oppositions in Western political thought.  CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 21-26.  She argues that 
“‘[p]olitics’ has both private and public dimensions as reflected in, on the one hand, the extent 
to which the private domain is implicated in the political process and, on the other, the lack of 
fit between the public sphere and the boundaries of the political.”  Id. at 26.  Therefore, the 
public/private dichotomy cannot provide insights into the content, form, and representation of 
political activity carried out by women in different parts of the world.  Id. at 21-26. 
 111. See, e.g., id., at 17-21; Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in 
the “Domestic” Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 391 (2001); Nancy 
Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L 
L. J. 625, 627-28, 646 (1993); Macklin, supra note 105, at 232-36. 
 112. E.g., Roberts, supra note 105, at 185.  Roberts is referring to the Australian case of 
Khawar, but her comment is more widely applicable.  As Crawley notes, “although international 
law is gender-neutral in theory, in practice it interacts with gender-based domestic laws and 
social structures which relegate women and men to separate spheres of existence.”  CRAWLEY, 
supra note 10, at 19. 
 113. Hilary Charlesworth, What are “Women’s International Human Rights?,” in HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58, 60 (Rebecca Cook 
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The second mistaken assumption—that the claimant’s own 
identity is not “political”—has occurred because of a definition of 
politics that has focused upon conventional institutions, such as 
political parties, political organizations or movements, trade unions, 
and the work of political elites—all institutions that have tended to 
marginalize women.114  As Crawley notes, this narrow definition of 
what is political and therefore “public” is particularly detrimental to 
women “in the context of the asylum determination process because 
women often participate as political subjects in different ways than 
men, and the predominant emphasis on participation within formal, 
constitutional, government-oriented institutions or procedures 
provides a misleading view of women’s political identity.”115  Political 
activity should be seen to include ad hoc politics and protest activity 
directed against the existing regime.116  Some women may not be 
writing speeches, attending demonstrations, or writing publications, 
but they might be involved in “informal organisations and meetings, 
providing food, clothing and medical care, hiding people [and] 
passing messages from one political activist to another . . . .  All of 
these activities may be essential for the on-going existence of the 
political organization, and the knowledge women gain through these 
activities puts them in danger and at risk” of persecution.117  
Furthermore, since women’s status, identities, and beliefs are often 
subsumed into the status, identities, and beliefs of males in their 
family, there may be an assumption on the part of perpetrators that 
the women share the political views of the male family members.118 
The assumption that women’s activities and experiences are not 
political has led to some troubling refugee determination decisions 
that have understandably been widely criticized.119  One oft-cited 
 
ed., 1994); Hilary Charlesworth, General Introduction, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW xix, xxii (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999). 
 114. CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 22-26. 
 115. Id. at 24. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 25. 
 119. See, e.g., Anker, Refugee Law, supra note 86, at 140; Macklin, supra note 105, at 226; 
Kelly, supra note 111, at 638-40; Amber Ann Porter, Casenote, The Role of Domesic Violence in 
the Consideration of Gender-Based Asylum Claims: In Re R-A-, An Antiquated Approach, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 315, 334-37 (2001); Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and 
its Implications, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177, 1185-86 (1999) (critiquing specific cases 
decided in the United States).  Two of these troubling cases are In Re R-A- and Klawitter v. 
I.N.S.  In In re R-A-, a woman who was subjected to intensive physical and psychological abuse 
by her Guatemalan army officer husband, and who the police failed to protect despite multiple 
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example of this flawed and decontextualized decision making is the 
U.S. case of Campos-Guardado v. INS, in which a woman, whose 
family members had been politically active in El Salvador, was forced 
to watch the murder of her male family members and then was raped, 
alongside other female family members, while one attacker chanted 
political slogans.120  The court and board found that the attack was 
personally, not politically, motivated.  The subsequently-drafted 
United States’ “Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating 
Claims From Women” essentially repudiated this finding, noting that 
the “court might reasonably have concluded that the chanting of 
political slogans during the rape indicated not merely that the 
attackers were politically motivated, but more specifically that they 
believed the petitioner to have contrary political views and that they 
punished her because of it.”121  This same document states that the 
“appearance of sexual violence in a claim should not lead 
adjudicators to conclude automatically that the claim is an instance of 
purely personal harm.”122  The Campos-Guardado case and others 
have led refugee law policy and decision-makers to understand that 
sexual violence cannot be solely understood in terms of “personal” or 
“individual” characteristics of the specific men who are the 
perpetrators.123  This misdirected focus fails to recognize that the 
violence is itself gendered and an expression of gender inequality.  
For this reason, the Summary Conclusions on Gender-Related 
Persecution stemming from the Global Consultations on International 
Protection state that “[t]he main problem facing women asylum 
seekers is the failure of decision makers to . . . recognize the political 
nature of seemingly private acts of harm to women.”124 
 
complaints, was denied refugee status because the abuse she suffered resulted from personal 
circumstances involving a senseless and irrational man whose motives were unrelated to refugee 
law’s persecutory grounds.  22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 915 (B.I.A. June 11, 1999).  In Klawitter v. 
I.N.S., the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum to a Polish woman 
who claimed that a government official had sexually and physically harassed her while 
threatening to destroy her career.  970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).  The court explained that the 
official’s actions were the result of his desire to be her “paramour,” and therefore his “interest” 
was merely personal.  Id. at 152. 
 120. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 121. U.S. GENDER CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 76, ¶ 11. 
 122. Id. ¶ 9. 
 123. See id. (“The appearance of sexual violence in a claim should not lead adjudicators to 
conclude automatically that the claim is an instance of purely personal harm.”). 
 124. Expert Roundtable Organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, Sept. 6-8, 2001, 
Summary Conclusions: Gender-Related Persecution, ¶ 4. 
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How do these developments in refugee law assist the ICC?  They 
illustrate just how carefully the ICC must draw the boundaries 
between what is and what is not persecution.  In deciding whether 
certain actions amount to gender-based persecution, the ICC’s judges 
will also be deciding what amounts to persecution and what does not 
rise to the level of, or qualify as, persecution.  Inherent within these 
decisions is an examination of what is to be considered “public” and 
what is to be considered “private,” which can change from case to 
case.125  If the ICC understands “gender,” “public,” and “private” in a 
properly comprehensive manner, learning from past mistakes and 
current more progressive approaches of refugee law,126 then it will be 
unlikely to mischaracterize fundamental rights violations committed 
against women as personal matters. 
3. Determining Degrees of Discrimination.  Apart from 
providing illustrations of acts that can amount to gender-based 
fundamental violations of rights, refugee law is also instructive in 
distinguishing between degrees of discrimination, between what 
might be termed “lower-level” discrimination, and discrimination that 
amounts to a violation of fundamental rights and therefore 
persecution.  The UNHCR Gender Guidelines state that, “[w]hile it is 
generally agreed that ‘mere’ discrimination may not, in the normal 
course, amount to persecution in and of itself, a pattern of 
discrimination or less favourable treatment could, on cumulative 
grounds, amount to persecution . . . .”127  This assessment of the 
 
 125. The validity of the public/private dichotomy itself can and should be challenged, but, as 
Crawley notes, “[d]espite the problems which are inherent to any critique of the public/private 
dichotomy, this theoretical approach remains necessary because the assumption that underlies 
all law, including international refugee law, is that the public/private distinction is real.”  
CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 20.  Refugee law commentators, such as Jenni Millbank, have 
noted that conceptions of public and private differ in cases involving specific aspects of gender 
identity, including cases involving lesbians and gay men.  Jenni Millbank, Imagining Otherness: 
Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in Canada and Australia, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 144 
(2002); Jenni Millbank, Gender, Sex and Visibility in Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 71, 73 (2003) [hereinafter Millbank, Gender, Sex and 
Visibility]. 
 126. Not all refugee decision-makers have learned from past mistakes.  For example, 
Musalo et al. noted that “[d]espite the patent ‘political’ character of rape in time of war, war-
rape [refugee] cases, like gender-related cases in general, are vulnerable to a certain tendency to 
characterize human rights violations against women as a personal matter.”  KAREN MUSALO, 
JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 646 (2d ed. 2002).  See also Crawley & Lester, supra note 76, 
at 35 (“[S]exual violence is still considered by many [refugee] decision-makers to be a private 
acts rather than an act of persecution.”). 
 127. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 14. 
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distinction between discrimination and persecution must be made in a 
gender-sensitive manner.  There are gendered differences with 
respect to the consideration of what amounts to discrimination and 
how to measure cumulative acts, as well as in evaluating the 
difference between “lower-level” or “mere” discrimination and 
persecutory discrimination. 
Refugee law demonstrates that discrimination that is 
omnipresent within a country (or globally) should not be viewed as 
“lower-level” or “mere” discrimination even though its widespread 
nature makes it “ordinary.”128  Discrimination does not need to be 
extraordinary in order to rise to the level of persecution.  This 
consideration is crucial when considering gender-based persecution 
because discrimination on the basis of gender—including violence 
against women and discrimination against homosexuals—is, 
unfortunately, commonplace.  As Audrey Macklin notes, “the 
ubiquity and frequency of gender-specific violence does not detract 
from its character as persecution.”129 
The Canadian Gender Guidelines address this issue in the 
context of violence against women by noting that “[t]he fact that 
violence, including sexual and domestic violence, against women is 
universal is irrelevant when determining whether rape, and other 
gender-specific crimes constitute forms of persecution.”130  This 
 
 128. For example, see the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, which recognize that discriminatory 
state policy or practice (which is, by definition, widespread) can amount to persecution.  Id.  
“Significant to gender-related claims is also an analysis of forms of discrimination by the State in 
failing to extend protection to individuals against certain types of harm.  If the State, as a matter 
of policy or practice, does not accord certain rights or protection from serious abuse, then the 
discrimination in extending protection, which results in serious harm inflicted with impunity, 
could amount to persecution.”  Id. ¶ 15; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Canadian Gender Guidelines).  Similarly, the UK Gender Guidelines state that 
“[t]he fact that violence against women is common and widespread in a particular society does 
not mean that it can not amount to persecution.  Each case should be considered on its own 
merits against country information and not disregarded because such treatment is common and 
widespread.”  UK GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 76, at 2.  The courts in New Zealand have 
recognized that widespread gender-based discrimination can amount to persecution, noting, 
“[d]iscrimination can affect gender-based groups to different degrees . . . various acts of 
discrimination, in their cumulative effect, can deny human dignity in key ways and should 
properly be recognized as persecution for the purposes of the Convention.”  CRAWLEY, supra 
note 10, at 47 (citing New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Appeal No. 2039/93 
(Feb. 12, 1996)).  The United Kingdom case of Shah and Islam takes a similar approach.  Islam 
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t; Islam v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Shah; R. v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t ex parte Shah [1999] I.N.L.R. 144 (H.L.). 
 129. Macklin, supra note 105, at 237. 
 130. CANADIAN GENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 76, § (B).  See also Rodger Haines, 
Gender-Related Persecution, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S 
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insight from refugee law is essential for the ICC’s jurisprudence on 
the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution.  Some 
commentators have expressed fear that the phrase “context of 
society” in the definition of “gender” in the Rome Statute of the ICC 
may narrow or prevent approaches that rely on the social 
construction of gender.131  They seem to fear that the ICC’s 
Prosecutor and judges must defer to the case-specific context, by 
situating themselves within—and potentially accepting—a 
discriminatory framework in order to determine whether gender was 
the basis for persecution.  This is not the case.132  The ICC does not 
need to accept the widespread nature of discrimination as reflective of 
a particular society and then only consider discrimination that 
distinguishes itself from the “ordinary.”  Under the Rome Statute, the 
examination of a specific society is done for several reasons, 
including, to understand how gender is constructed in that particular 
society, to understand the role that discrimination plays in 
maintaining that gender construct, to examine whether a particular 
victim fell within or outside of that gender construct and mode of 
discrimination, and to evaluate all of these considerations in light of 
international law133 when determining whether particular acts amount 
to violations of fundamental rights.134  The “context of society” is not 
only the domestic society, but also the international society.135  The 
 
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 105, at 319, 333 
(“Breaches of human rights cannot be ignored, discounted, or explained away on the basis of 
culture, tradition, or religion.”). 
 131. Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects and International Law, 15 CAN. 
J. L. & JURIS. 281, 284; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Promotion & 
Prot. of Human Rights, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: 
Violence Against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/45, Violence Against Women Perpetrated and/or 
Condoned by the State During Times of Armed Conflict (1997-2000), ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/73 (Jan. 23, 2001). 
 132. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 75. 
 133. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3). 
 134. For a discussion of the factors ICC judges might consider with respect to the context of 
any given society, see Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 74-76. 
 135. Id. at 76.  The concern about “context of society” is also directly related to the issue of 
reconciling universal human rights (such as the prohibition of discrimination based on sex found 
in the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women) with 
cultural (or in this case societal) relativism.  There is a balance between respecting a culture or 
society (by approaching it in a non-ethnocentric manner) and respecting human rights.  The 
phrase “context of society” has been misconstrued as tipping that balance solely to societal 
relativism.  As Crawley notes in the refugee context, “‘[c]ulture’ and ‘tradition’ cannot be used 
to defend human rights abuses because cultural values and cultural practices are as legitimately 
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fact that the international society condemns discrimination on the 
basis of sex136 and violence against women137 must be taken into 
account, not only when generally considering the meaning of gender, 
but also when deciding what amounts to persecution.138  Refugee law 
provides a necessary precedent for this approach because it considers 
both the domestic and international social construction of gender.139 
B. The Perpetrator’s Targeting was Based on Gender Grounds 
A key element for the crime against humanity of gender-based 
persecution is that the perpetrator’s targeting of the victim(s) was 
based on gender grounds.140  In order to fully comprehend this 
element, the ICC’s Prosecutor and judges must understand what 
gender is and how gender identity also includes identities based on 
sexual orientation or sexual “outlaw” status.  In addition, they need 
to consider how gender is linked to intent so that certain acts can be 
correctly described as being “based on” gender, leaving other acts to 
be properly understood as based on grounds other than gender. 
1. Defining “Gender.”  “Gender” in the Rome Statute is 
defined as referring “to the two sexes, male and female, within the 
context of society.  The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning 
different from the above.”141  While this definition is “peculiar and 
 
subject to criticism from a human rights perspective as any other structural aspect of society.  In 
this context, it is important to consider what is meant by ‘culture’ when it is used to defend 
violations of women’s human rights . . . .  Respect for international human rights law does not 
require that every culture use an identical approach, but it does require that human rights be 
defined and protected in a manner consonant with international principles.”  CRAWLEY, supra 
note 10, at 11-12. 
 136. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
art. 2, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 137. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. 
GOAR, 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 138. Under the Rome Statute, persecution “means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or 
collectivity.”  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(g).  An evaluation of fundamental rights 
would include an evaluation of fundamental human rights, such as those found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights:  the right to be free of discrimination and the right to life, liberty, 
and security of the person.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 139. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 76. 
 140. Elements of Crimes, supra note 3, at 15. 
 141. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3). 
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circular,”142 it was crafted to provide broad guidance to decision-
makers so that they understand that gender is a construct built upon 
social understandings of what is expected of those of the male and 
female biological sex.143  The exact contours of the numerous 
components and considerations in understanding “gender” are left to 
the ICC’s judges (and in some cases, the Prosecutor and Registrar), 
albeit with helpful markers throughout the Rome Statute to assist in 
this process.144  The detailed definitions of the term “gender” used 
within the United Nations and its agencies also provide guidance as 
indicators of the current international understanding of the content of 
the term.145  Thus, the definition of gender in the UNHCR’s Gender 
Guidelines can and should provide assistance to the ICC in evaluating 
and populating the content of the term: 
Gender refers to the relationship between women and men based 
on socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, status, 
roles and responsibilities that are assigned to one sex or another, 
while sex is a biological determination.  Gender is not static or 
innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning 
over time.146 
This definition highlights two interrelated issues of importance to the 
ICC:  first, that “gender” and “sex” are two different terms and 
therefore have different meanings, and second, that gender identities 
are changeable social and cultural constructions of identity, status, 
roles, and responsibilities.147 
The use of the term “gender” in the Rome Statute was 
deliberate.  Delegates considered and rejected using the term “sex” 
instead of “gender.”148  Thus, it would be wrong for the ICC to 
confuse gender with sex, as the result would be an incorrectly narrow 
understanding of gender-based persecution.  The ICC can learn from 
mistakes made within the refugee law context.  Crawley has noted 
that the terms “gender” and “sex” have tended to be used 
interchangeably in refugee law, with the unfortunate result that the 
 
 142. Copelon, supra note 2, at 236. 
 143. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 72-73.  Some commentators have critiqued the Rome 
Statute’s reliance on the term “sex” to define “gender” because such an approach does not take 
into account theories that define “gender” without reference to “sex” and therefore loses 
certain subversive possibilities.  See, e.g., Cossman, supra note 131, at 284. 
 144. Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 81-82. 
 145. Id. at 66-71, 82. 
 146. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 3. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Steains, supra note 2, at 373-74; see Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 58-66. 
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word “gender” has simply been understood to mean “woman.”149  
Thomas Spijkerboer has also noted that “gender” and “woman” are 
often conflated in refugee literature and statistics.150  The collapsing of 
“gender” into “woman” leads to confusion about what is meant by 
“gender-related persecution,” and to a lack of understanding about 
the relationship between the form of the harm suffered or feared and 
the required grounds.151  It also tends to homogenize women as a 
category, overlooking critical differences between women within and 
between particular countries and contexts.152 
The ICC must avoid the improper equation of “gender” with 
“woman.”  If the ICC understood gender-based persecution as simply 
persecution of women, this would both overinclude and underinclude 
acts in the “gender” category, potentially distorting both prosecutions 
and convictions for this crime.  Individuals have multiple, cross-
cutting identities related to their age, religion, profession, socio-
economic status, legal status, family status, political beliefs, and 
sexual orientation, among other characteristics.  Overinclusion within 
the ground of “gender” can occur if a woman is targeted for 
persecution because of any of these non-sex-focused grounds, but 
because she happens to be a female instead of a male victim, the 
crime is categorized only as gender-based persecution.153  Conversely, 
underinclusion can occur if crimes against men who are targeted 
because of their gender are not charged as gender-based persecution, 
but are categorized as falling within the other enumerated grounds or 
are charged as other crimes against humanity.154 
The problems of both outcomes are clear.  In the refugee 
context, this results in the creation of a “male experience” of 
persecution and a “female model,” with the female model 
overemphasizing sexual violence at the expense of other forms of 
 
 149. CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 6-7.  This is not only an issue in refugee law.  Hilary 
Charlesworth has stated that “U.N. gender mainstreaming policies assume that ‘gender’ is a 
synonym for women.”  Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming 
and Human Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 14 (2005). 
 150. SPIJKERBOER, supra note 10, at 194-95. 
 151. CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 7. 
 152. Id. at 8. 
 153. Of course, sex might be an important factor in how these other identities are created, 
which is related to the fact that these identities are influenced by the social construction of 
gender. 
 154. As Charlesworth notes in the human rights context, this “leaves both the roles of men 
and male gender identities unexamined, as though they were somehow natural and immutable.”  
Charlesworth, supra note 149, at 15. 
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repression experienced by women.155  Crawley notes, “Looking at 
gender as opposed to sex enables an approach which can 
accommodate specificity, diversity and heterogeneity.  It also ensures 
that the asylum claims of women are not routinely dismissed as 
culturally relative and therefore outside the mechanisms for 
protection available under the Refugee Convention.”156  The same 
analysis applies to the ICC:  a focus which is squarely on gender, and 
not only on women, allows for a truer understanding of how the 
importance of gender identities will vary from case to case and how 
these identities vary between and within cultures and across time.  
This nuanced understanding of gender will allow for a better 
understanding of the violation of fundamental rights, and how 
targeting may differ between men and women within society. 
2. Sexual Orientation and Gender.  Another important lesson to 
be learned from the refugee law context is that sexual orientation or 
status as a sexual “outlaw”157 has gendered elements.158  The UNHCR 
Gender Guidelines make this explicit: 
A claimant’s sexuality or sexual practices may be relevant to a 
refugee claim where he or she has been subject to persecutory 
(including discriminatory) action on account of his or her sexuality 
or sexual practices.  In many such cases, the claimant has refused to 
adhere to socially or culturally defined roles or expectations of 
behaviour attributed to his or her sex.  The most common claims 
involve homosexuals, transsexuals or transvestites, who have faced 
extreme public hostility, violence, abuse or severe or cumulative 
discrimination.159 
 
 155. CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 8. 
 156. Id. at 9. 
 157. Brenda Cossman uses this term in her critique of international law’s “limited 
understanding of sex, gender and sexual identity” to include “fringe dwellers, those whose lives 
have been lived beyond the margins of the international arena” such as “the queer subject, the 
drag queen, the bull dyke, the cross dresser, the transsexual, the transgendered, the sex worker, 
the S/M dominatrix.”  Cossman, supra note 131, at 289. 
 158. Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International Law: An Overall 
Perspective, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 105, at 3, 21.  Edwards notes 
that the links between sexual orientation and gender-based persecution are still being 
developed.  Edwards, supra note 105, at 47. 
 159. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 16.  Crawley notes that sexual orientation 
cases should not be confused with cases involving transsexuals, for example, but recognizes that 
case law tends to confuse or conflate the two.  CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 163 n.1.  The 
UNHCR Gender Guidelines do not clearly make the distinction.  See UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 16. 
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This Guideline indicates that the concept of “gender” must be 
interpreted to include those who do not conform to socially-
constructed gender roles through non-sexual forms of expression, 
such as transvestites.  Domestic refugee decisions have also 
recognized that persecution based on sexual orientation or 
transsexuality is intimately related to the socially-constructed 
understanding of “maleness” and “femaleness.”160  In the context of 
sexual orientation, at least one refugee law commentator has 
highlighted that it is important for decision-makers to differentiate 
between lesbian and gay male experiences,161 which reiterates the 
point that gender is multilayered and, in every case, must be 
understood as such. 
It is important that the ICC’s Prosecutor and judges understand 
how sexual orientation or sexual “outlaw” status and gender overlap 
and intersect when considering the definition of “gender” in the crime 
against humanity of gender-based persecution.  Some academic 
commentators have mistakenly concluded that the definition of 
“gender” in the Rome Statute excludes considerations of sexual 
orientation or sexual “outlaws.”162  In fact, the Rome Statute text 
effectively leaves the term “gender” open for the ICC to interpret and 
apply to the circumstances before it, as appropriate.163  It would be 
 
 160. Crawley describes a case in which a Russian woman who was a lesbian was subjected to 
various forms of discrimination.  The Canadian Refugee Determination Division found that the 
claimant’s sexual orientation and ethnicity increased her vulnerability to rape and physical 
assault by marginalizing her economically and socially:  “Taking into account the claimant’s 
sexual orientation, her ethnic identity and her identity as a woman, the Canadian authorities 
determined that there was a reasonable chance of her being persecuted if she returned to 
Russia.”  CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 166.  Crawley also cites the case of a female-to-male 
transsexual from Lebanon, in which the claimant was granted refugee status because “Lebanon 
is a highly traditional and patriarchal society where deviation from well-defined gender roles is 
not tolerated.”  Id. at 168. 
 161. Millbank, Gender, Sex and Visibility, supra note 125, at 83. 
 162. See Cossman, supra note 131, at 284; Stephanie Farrior, The Rights of Women in 
International Human Rights Law Textbooks: Segregation, Integration, or Omission?, 12 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 587, 589 (2003); Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-
Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 
317, 340, 351 (2002).  See also Charlesworth and Philips, who fear that the definition of 
“gender” in the Rome Statute deliberately reflects the concerns of conservative states that the 
reference to “gender” might be understood to include “sexual orientation.”  Hilary 
Charlesworth, The Gender of International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety-Third Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 206, 207 
(1999); Ruth B. Philips, Too Close to Home?: International Criminal Law, War Crimes and 
Family Violence, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 229, 233 n.14 (2002).  For an elaborated explanation 
of why this assumption is mistaken, see Oosterveld, supra note 5, at 76-78. 
 163. Steains, supra note 2, at 374. 
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difficult to imagine that the ICC would refuse to consider persecution 
on the basis of sexual orientation or sexual “outlaw” status through 
the lens of gender, given the underlying linkages between gender 
identity and this form of oppression.  As Rhonda Copelon has 
convincingly argued, it is “dubious to argue that any ambiguity [in the 
Rome Statute’s definition of “gender”] should be resolved in favor of 
discrimination” on the basis of sexual identity.164  The UNHCR 
Gender Guidelines and domestic refugee decisions support this 
conclusion.165 
3. Defining “Based On.”  Under the Rome Statute, the 
perpetrator’s targeting must be based on particular prohibited 
grounds, which include gender.166  This determination requires an 
evaluation of how the ground of gender is causally connected to the 
perpetrator’s targeting.  Refugee law has grappled with how to define 
that causal connection, offering an analysis that can assist the ICC.167  
Yet, before analyzing how refugee law approaches this causal 
connection, it is important to ask if anything first turns on the 
differences in the causal language used in refugee law, the Rome 
Statute, and the ICC’s Elements of Crimes.  Refugee law uses the 
phrase “for reasons of,” the Rome Statute simply says “on,” and the 
Elements state that the targeting must be “based on” specific 
grounds.168  It appears that these differences in terminology do not 
reflect a consequential difference in meaning.  The phrase “for 
reasons of” is meant to define marginalization by reference to norms 
of non-discrimination:  it links the claimant’s socio-political situation 
with her resulting marginalization.169  The use of “on” in the Rome 
Statute reflects the precedent set by the International Military 
Tribunals.170  Finally, the use of “based on” in the Elements appears 
to be more related to the need to use a descriptor prior to “on” in 
order to be grammatically correct rather than any substantive 
 
 164. Copelon, supra note 2, at 237. 
 165. Supra text accompanying note 159. 
 166. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (using the term “on”).  Cf. Elements of Crimes, 
supra note 3, at 15 (using the phrase “based on”). 
 167. See, e.g., CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 7-8; Macklin, supra note 105, at 258-59; Randall, 
supra note 89, at 303-04; Roberts, supra note 105, at 164. 
 168. Elements of Crimes, supra note 3, at 15; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h); 
Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2). 
 169. HATHAWAY, LAW, supra note 8, at 136-37. 
 170. See discussion supra Part I. 
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reasoning.171  While the UNHCR Gender Guidelines use the term 
“gender-related,” it is clear from those Guidelines that the term 
“related” is meant to have the same meaning as the Refugee 
Convention’s “for reasons of.”172  Thus, the terms “for reasons of,” 
“related,” “on,” and “based on” all have a similar meaning. 
Gender identities, which are multifaceted and overlap with 
numerous other identities, can result in multiple motivations for 
targeting within refugee law.173  Roberts notes that it is sometimes 
difficult to identify gendered motivations, so these motivations are 
unfortunately often ignored when other motivations can more easily 
be identified and causally connected to intent.174  Audrey Macklin has 
proposed a way to distinguish how gender, motivation, and intent are, 
and are not, causally connected in the refugee law context.  
According to Macklin, decision-makers must distinguish, for example, 
between persecution that takes gender-specific forms and persecution 
because of gender:  “[t]he idea of women being persecuted as women 
is not the same as women being persecuted because they are women.  
The former addresses forms of persecution that are gender-
specific. . . . [The latter] addresses a causal relationship between 
gender and persecution.”175 
Macklin provides the following example: “one may be 
persecuted as a woman (e.g., raped) for reasons unrelated to gender 
 
 171. Elements of Crimes, supra note 3, at 15.  Other phrases were used in the original 
proposals that were the focus of negotiations over the elements of persecution.  The U.S. 
proposal used “motivated by.”  Proposal submitted by the United States of America, Draft 
Elements of Crimes, at 7, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.1 (Feb. 4, 1999).  The 
Canadian/German proposal used “committed on.”  Proposal submitted by Canada and Germany 
on article 7, at 8, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.36 (Nov. 23, 1999).  The proposal  of a 
number of Arab States also used “motivated by.”  Proposal submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab 
Republic and United Arab Emirates concerning the elements of crimes against humanity, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.39 (Dec. 3, 1999).  The drafters of the Elements of Crimes 
avoided language in third element of the definition of persecution, which would have already 
been covered by article 30 of the Rome Statute; consequently the drafters settled on using 
“based on,” which was uncontroversial.  Witschel & Rückert, supra note 30, at 97; see also 
Elements of Crimes, supra note 3, at 15; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 30.  Similarly, the use 
of “by reason of” in the second element of the definition of persecution (in the Elements of 
Crimes) simply reproduced the wording of the definition of persecution in the Rome Statute.  
Elements of Crimes, supra note 3, at 15; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(g). 
 172. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 4. 
 173. Roberts, supra note 105, at 188. 
 174. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 435 (Sep. 17, 
2003) (“While the intent to discriminate need not be the primary intent . . . , it must be a 
significant one.”). 
 175. Macklin, supra note 105, at 258-59.  See also CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 6-9. 
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(e.g., membership in an opposition political party),176 not persecuted 
as a woman but still because of gender (e.g., flogged for refusing to 
wear a veil), and persecuted as and because one is a woman (e.g., 
genital mutilation).”177  She concludes that, even though all three of 
these cases present examples of gendered persecution, it does not 
follow that each of them ought to be framed as persecution on 
grounds of gender.178  She would categorize “the first claimant as one 
who fears persecution on the basis of political opinion, not gender.”179  
Roberts uses different terminology to make a similar point:  “gender-
specific harm” refers “to harm that is unique to, or more commonly 
befalls, members of one sex,” and “‘gender-related persecution’ refers 
to a causal relationship between the persecution and the reason for 
the persecution.”180  However, Roberts would expand Macklin’s 
categorization of women persecuted as women to include both 
persecution that uses gender-specific means and persecution that has 
gender-specific outcomes.181 
Macklin stresses these analytical distinctions for two reasons.  
First, it is important to identify clearly the relationship between 
gender, the violations, and persecution since “[g]ender-related 
violations do not necessarily constitute persecution because of 
gender.182  Second, it is important to avoid the twin extremes of 
collapsing [all] persecution of women into . . . ‘persecution on grounds 
of gender’ . . . [or] submerging the gender component entirely under 
other [grounds].”183  The former extreme reinforces “women’s 
marginalization by implying that only men have political opinions, 
only men are activated by religion, only men have racial presence,” 
while the latter extreme erases women’s gender-specific experience.184 
 
 176. See also CRAWLEY, supra note 10, at 8.  Crawley, following Macklin’s approach, gives 
this example:  “if a man’s genitals are subjected to electric shocks, he is certainly being tortured 
in a gender-specific way, but it does not follow that he is being persecuted because of his 
gender.”  Id. 
 177. Macklin, supra note 105, at 259. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  This approach is also found in less sophisticated forms.  E.g., CANADIAN GENDER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 76, at 2 (“Obviously, not all claims brought forward by women are 
specifically gender-related.”). 
 180. Roberts, supra note 105, at 164 n.31. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Macklin, supra note 105, at 259. 
 183. Id.  Note that this problem is intimately related to the conflation of “gender” and 
“women” within refugee law discussed above.  Id. 
 184. Id. 
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Macklin’s analysis is somewhat applicable to the work of the 
ICC, but for different reasons than it is applicable in the refugee 
context.  Under the Refugee Convention, the causal link required is 
that the persecution be “for reasons of” the listed grounds, which do 
not include gender.185  The causal link between gender and 
persecution is therefore accomplished through the listed grounds, and 
“the Convention ground must be a relevant contributing factor, 
though it need not be . . . the sole, or dominant, cause.”186  As the 
UNHCR’s Gender Guidelines note, “in many gender-related claims, 
the difficult issue for a decision-maker may not be deciding upon the 
applicable ground, so much as the causal link:  that the well-founded 
fear of being persecuted was for reasons of that ground.”187  Macklin’s 
distinction is meant to show that the causal link between gender and 
persecution need be pursued only in those cases where the 
persecution occurs because of gender.  In the cases involving 
persecution as a woman (or as a man), the causal link is between the 
stated ground itself and persecution, and the decision-maker need not 
establish the additional nexus to gender. 
Unlike the Refugee Convention, the Rome Statute includes 
gender as a discrete prohibited persecutory ground.188  Therefore, the 
need to “read” gender through the lens of other listed grounds is not 
necessary.  Even so, Macklin’s analysis does have some relevance to 
the work of the ICC:  the causal link between gender and persecution 
should be pursued by the ICC in cases where persecution occurs 
because of gender.  It might be more appropriate to pursue other 
grounds when the persecution is gender-specific, but not because of 
gender.189  However, a crucial note of caution is needed with respect 
 
 185. Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2).  See also HATHAWAY, LAW, supra 
note 8, at 137 (describing this causal link by noting “refugee law requires that there be a nexus 
between who the claimant is or what she believes and the risk of serious harm in her home 
state”). 
 186. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 20. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1. 
 189. Macklin notes that for this reason, in the refugee context, it is important to recognize 
rape as torture.  Macklin, supra note 105, at 259.  The case law of the International Criminal 
Tribunals is very helpful in this regard, having already recognized that rape can amount to 
torture.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 149-51 (June 12, 2002).  If the 
gender-specific act was that of “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization,” or any other comparable form of sexual violence, then a charge could be 
brought for those specific crimes against humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute.  
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. 
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to Macklin’s approach.  While Macklin’s approach can provide 
conceptual clarity with respect to the causal link between gender and 
persecutory targeting, in reality it may be very difficult to neatly 
divide cases into persecution because of gender versus gender-specific 
persecution.  The difference between the two is not always clear, and 
they can be inextricably intertwined and almost impossible to 
separate. 
In addition, it is arguable that rape or sexual violence committed 
against a woman always has an underlying persecutory intent, even if 
there is an overlying political, religious, or other intent.190  Roberts 
avers to this by providing the following example: 
If a woman who was vaginally raped would have been persecuted in 
another way had she been a man, then the crime may be gender-
specific, but it may not amount to gender-related persecution.  
However, if that woman would not have been subjected to 
persecution had she been a man, then the persecution may be 
gender-related.  It is also arguable that the sexual nature of the 
violence perpetrated against women represents an expression of 
hatred against women.  After all, if the motivation for harm were 
gender-neutral, why would the harm take a gender-specific form?191 
Thus, some might take the position that certain violations, such as 
rape, can never be divided between persecution because of gender 
and persecution as a woman (or a man), since the perpetrator’s 
persecutory intent must inherently be guided by gender-based 
discrimination and therefore will never be gender-neutral.192  Even so, 
there may be times when Macklin’s categorization will help the ICC’s 
Prosecutor decide whether a charge of gender-based persecution or a 
charge of persecution based on other grounds is more clearly 
provable (as opposed to applicable) in a given case.  The nuanced 
analysis required in establishing the causal link between gender and 
the perpetrator’s targeting demonstrates that the ICC’s Prosecutor 
and judges must spend time building a case-specific understanding of 
the social construction of gender. 
Macklin’s point that it is important to avoid subsuming all 
persecution of women into “persecution on grounds of gender,” as 
well as to avoid submerging the gender component entirely under 
 
 190. E.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 180-91 (2006).  While Mackinnon discusses rape in the context of 
genocide, her analysis also clearly extends to gender-based persecution.  See id. 
 191. Roberts, supra note 105, at 189. 
 192. This overlap between Macklin’s categories stems from the fact that gender intersects 
with and is inseparable from an individual’s other identities.  See id. 
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other grounds, is also applicable to the work of the ICC.  The 
temptation will be for the Prosecutor to include “gender” as a ground 
if the persecuted group or collectivity involves women.  If the 
Prosecutor has evidence that the persecution involved persecution 
because of gender, then it is appropriate to include gender as grounds 
in the indictment.  However, if the evidence demonstrates that the 
persecution was not based on gender (although keeping in mind that 
certain acts, such as rape, are viewed by some as always 
demonstrating evidence of gender-based persecution), then other 
persecutory grounds might be more appropriate (or, at least, more 
straightforward to prove). 
Since gender is listed as a discrete category in the Rome Statute’s 
list of persecutory grounds,193 it is less likely to be improperly 
subsumed into other categories than in refugee law.  However, it is 
possible that without a proper analysis of the intersections between 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or other 
impermissible grounds and gender, the gendered aspects of these 
grounds can be overlooked.194  As Macklin notes, the “easy 
acceptance of ‘intersectionality’ in refugee law minimizes the danger 
of distorting the presentation of a woman’s claim in the name of 
facilitating success in the hearing room.”195  This ready acceptance of 
intersectionality should also become the norm within the ICC’s 
approach to persecutory grounds in order to avoid distorting the 
grounds of persecution in any given case.  As is done in refugee law, a 
particular person’s experience could be simultaneously analyzed 
under more than one ground:  “For example, a claim for refugee 
status based on transgression of social or religious norms may be 
analyzed in terms of religion, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group.”196  The ICC’s Prosecutor could similarly 
approach intersectionality by identifying interlinked grounds of 
persecution in indictments, and the ICC’s judges could consider 
persecution without necessarily delinking these grounds. 
 
 193. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. 
 194. For example, the UNHCR Gender Guidelines state that there is an overlap between a 
person’s gender, religious, and political identities:  “While religious tenets require certain kinds 
of behaviour from a woman, contrary behaviour may be perceived as evidence of an 
unacceptable political opinion.”  UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 26. 
 195. Macklin, supra note 105, at 263. 
 196. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, ¶ 23. 
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CONCLUSION 
The crime against humanity of gender-based persecution, 
codified in the Rome Statute, does not have any precedent in 
international criminal law.  When the ICC first examines gender-
based persecution, it should also explore refugee law—the only other 
area of international law that has considered this type of persecution.  
Given that refugee law has now accumulated a relatively substantial 
body of law and analysis on this type of persecution,197 it would be 
short-sighted for international criminal lawyers to ignore lessons 
learned in this area. 
The first, and most obvious, lesson learned from refugee law is 
that violations of fundamental rights in the context of gender-based 
persecution can be wide-ranging, from sexual violence and trafficking 
to violence in the family; in the community, by the state, or in civil 
war; discrimination in the home, at work, in civil and political rights, 
or in economic, social, and cultural rights; and discrimination or 
violence based on transgression of social and cultural mores.  These 
violations may be subtle and may only amount to persecution after 
many have accumulated, or the violations may amount to persecution 
through one egregious act.  The violations may also not look like the 
non-gendered violations that are assessed by the ICC’s Prosecutor 
and judges, even in the same case.  The violations may be linked to 
ubiquitous discrimination, and the ICC must not be misled by the 
widespread nature of such discrimination into believing that such 
discrimination is somehow “ordinary,” as opposed to “extraordinary” 
persecution.  The ICC’s Prosecutor and judges must be attuned to 
how the fundamental violations that lead to gender-based persecution 
may involve acts that seem “private” or personal but are in fact 
“public,” such as violations that include targeting women who believe 
in gender equality, targeting homosexuals or transsexuals because 
they do not conform to societal constructions of “maleness” and 
“femaleness,” or targeting men or boys because perpetrators 
characterize them as potential combatants. 
The second crucial lesson learned from refugee law is that gender 
identity is complex.  Gender is a relational concept.  It refers to the 
relationship between women and men based on socially constructed 
identities, roles, and responsibilities assigned to a particular sex.  The 
social constructions of “maleness” or “femaleness”—and therefore 
 
 197. For entire books on this topic, see CRAWLEY, supra note 10, and SPIJKERBOER, supra 
note 10. 
02__OOSTERVELD.DOC 3/9/2007  10:02 AM 
88 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:49 
the relations between men and women—can change over time and 
from culture to culture.  The meaning of “gender” is context-specific.  
“Gender” and “sex” are different concepts, and gender-based 
persecution is not the same as sex-based persecution.  Refugee 
decision-makers have sometimes equated the term “gender” with that 
of “sex,” or more often, with “women.”  This conflation has led to 
confusion over what gender-related persecution means in refugee law 
by leaving out analyses of persecution based on social construction of 
“maleness,” and persecution of women that is in fact based on other 
grounds, such as political opinion.  In addition, this conflation 
obscures consideration of sexual orientation or sexual “outlaw” status 
as one aspect of gender identity because it skews the focus toward 
issues of the biological (female) sex.  The ICC must be alert to 
avoiding the collapsing of “gender” and other terms in order to 
refrain from overinclusion or underinclusion of crimes within gender-
based persecution. 
The third area in which international refugee law can assist the 
ICC in its consideration of gender-based persecution is with respect 
to the causal connection between gender and the perpetrator’s 
targeting.  Refugee law commentators such as Macklin, Roberts, and 
Crawley have highlighted the need for conceptual clarity as to what 
amounts to gender-related persecution in refugee law.  Macklin, in 
particular, has identified the difference between persecution because 
of gender and persecution of a woman (or man) as a woman (or 
man).  This distinction can be helpful with respect to the crime 
against humanity of gender-based persecution because it can assist, 
insofar as it is possible to separate these intertwined concepts, the 
ICC’s Prosecutor with ensuring that acts are charged under the most 
applicable grounds of persecution.  However, there is some 
consideration that certain acts, such as rape, might always be viewed 
as gender-based persecution, even if they also overlap with other 
types of persecution. 
It must be noted that, while these are lessons learned within 
refugee law, they are not lessons universally respected within 
domestic refugee decisions or in the courts that review these 
administrative decisions.  This fact does not invalidate the principles 
set out in the UNHCR’s Gender Guidelines, nor does it negate the 
positive developments found in domestic policy and decisions.  The 
ICC should not be deterred from seeking guidance from refugee law 
on gender-based persecution by the inconsistency within domestic 
refugee law. 
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The International Criminal Court will be the first international 
criminal justice institution to prosecute the crime against humanity of 
gender-based persecution.  It will undoubtedly use previous 
international criminal law analysis regarding other grounds of 
persecution, such as political, racial, or religious grounds, to assist in 
determining what amounts to gender-based persecution, but this will 
not provide all of the answers.  As the only other area of international 
law that has examined persecution on gender grounds, international 
refugee law provides some essential insights and distinctions that can 
guide the ICC in this area.  Ignoring the expertise accumulated within 
international refugee law would be a serious mistake. 
